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[Crim. No. 7768.

In Bank.

July 2,1964.]

In re WALTER NASH on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel on the
ground that his lawyer failed to object to the introduction of
allegedly ill('gally obtained evidence where the articles defendant claimed were seized illegally and improperly admitted
in evidence were observed in his room by police officers when
they entered lawfully to arrest defendant, and where the
police officers properly testified to observing the articles, but
it did not appear that such articles were seized at the time
of the arrest or were ever taken from defendant's apartnlent, or that such articles were offered or introduced in evidence.
[2] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-In a rape prosecution, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel
on the ground that his lawyer failed to impeach the prosecut-.
ing witness by introducing evidence that she was on parole for
another criminal offense at the time of the trial and committed
burglary four days after she testified where the parole arose
out of a juvenile court adjudication, the facts of which were
not admissible to impeach the prosecutrix, and where the alleged burglary took place after the verdict finding defendant
guilty had been returned.
(3] Id.-Appeal-Appointment of Counsel.-Where counsel is appointed to represent a defendant on appeal, thoroughly studies

• [1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim)Dal Law (1st ed § 167 et seq).
licK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 107; [3] Criminal
Law, § 1048.5.
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-The agreement was made on April 1, 1958, and plaintitr "became a
director of RF.I. on Moy I, 1958.
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the record, consults with defendant and trial counsel, and coll~
Bcientiously concludes that there are no meritorious grounds Of'
appeal, defendant's right to be represented by counsel on .p:'
peal has been met, and if, thereafter, the appellate court i8'
satisfied from its own review of the record in the light of any'J
points raised by defendant personally that counsel's assessment 1\
of the record is correct, it need not appoint another lawyer to'
represent defendant on appeal and may properly decide the \
appeal without oral argument.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from,
custody. Order to show cause discharged and writ denied.
Walter Nash, in pro. per., and Harry A. Ackley, under
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant
Attorney General, and Roger E. Venturi, Deputy Attorney
General, for Respondent.

"

TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found petitioner guilty of forcible
rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 3), and the trial court denied
his motion for a new trial and sentenced him to prison. He
appealed and requested that the District Court of Appeal for
the Third Appellate District appoint counsel to represent
him. That court appointed counsel who studied the record,
consulted with petitioner, and interviewed petitioner's trial
counsel and the trial court clerk and reporter. He then wrote
to the appellate court and to petitioner stating that in his
opinion there were no meritorious grounds of appeal. The
appellate court also informed petitioner of his counsel's determination and advised him that he might file a brief in
propria persona. It denied his request for the appointment of
other counsel on appeal. Thereafter petitioner filed an opening brief, the Attorney General filed a reply brief, and petitioner filed a closing brief. He wrote the counsel who bad '
been appointed to represent him on appeal and requested
that he file a supplemental brief and argue the appeal orally.
Counsel refused his requests, and the appeal was submitted
without orel argument by either side. The appellate court
affirmed the judgment (People v. Nash, 216 Cal.App.2d 491
[31 Ca1.Rptr. 195]) and dl:'nied a rehearing. This court denied a hearing. Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court, and that court requested the Attorney General to file a response in the light of
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Douglas v. State of California, 372 U.S. 353 [83 S.Ct. 8]4,
9 L.Ed.2d 811]. Thereafter on January 13, 1964, the United
States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. (Nash v. California, 375 U.S.9SS [84 S.Ct. 522, 11
L.Ed.2d 475].)
On February IS, 1964, petitioner filed this petition for a
writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at his
trial and on his appeal. We issued an order to show cause.
At his trial petitioner admitted that he had had sexual
intercourse with the prosecuting witness late at night in his
automobile after they had visited various places during the
course of the evening. He testified, however, that she consented
to the act. She testified that she did not consent, that she
attempted to escape across a muddy field, and that petitioner
caugllt her and carried her back to his car and overcame her
resistance by force. After the rape petitioner returned the
prosecuting witness to her grandmother's home, where she
was living. She immediately telephoned her mother in her
grandmother's presence and stated that petitioner had raped
her. The police were called, and the prosecuting witness directed them to petitioner's apartment. It was then about
3 a.m. Petitioner's car was parked outside and the hood was
warm although the weather was cold and wet. One of the
officers repeatedly knocked on petitioner's door and identified hin;tSelf, but he received no response. The noise aroused
the landlady, who on learning why the officers were there,
gave them a key to petitioner's apartment. They unlocked
the door and went in. Petitioner had on pajama bottoms and
a T-shirt, and the officers saw muddy slacks and damp and
muddy shoes in the room. They told petitioner that the prosecuting witness had accused him of rape and took him outside to the police car to confront her. She identified him as
her assailant. Petitioner denied to the officers that he knew
her and told them that he had not been out of the apartment
since 5 p.m. on the day before. The officers arrested petitioner
and took him to jail.
It appears jrom the record that petitioner was forcefully
and ably represented at his trial by the assistant public defender. He contends, however" that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel on the grounds that his counsel failed to
object to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence and
failed to introduce evidence to impeach the prosecuting witness.
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[1] With respect to the assertedly illegally obtained evidence, petitioner alleges in his petition that "The officers
searched the defendant and his room, and after they found
certain articles of clothing they placed him under arrest. The
evidence from the search was introduced and admitted at
petitioner's trial. The introduction of the evidence was not
objected to." Neitller the officers nor the petitioner testified
at the trial, however, that any search was made of petitioner's
room, and the clothing the officers observed when they
entered the room was neither offered nor introduced into evidence. It was not seized at the time of the arrest and whether
it was ever taken from the apartment does not appear. The
record establishes that the officers had reasonable cause to
arrest petitioner before they entered his apartment. They
lawfully entered his room to arrest him and could therefore
properly testify to what they observed in the room. (PeopZe
v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 379 [303 P.2d 721].) If, as petitioner contends, the officers conducted a search that could not
be justified as incident to his lawful arrest, no evidence of it
or its products was introduced at his trial. Accordingly, his
contention that his counsel improperly failed to object to the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence is totally devoid
of merit.
[2] 'Vith respect to counsel's assertcdly improper failure
to introduce evidence to impeach the prosecuting witness,
petitioner alleges that the prosecuting witness was on
parole for another criminal offense at the time of the trial
and committed burglary four days after she testified and that
his counsel failed to introduce evidence of these facts. From
the respondent's return it appears that the prosecuting witness was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and committed to the custody of her mother about two months before the
alleged rape. At the time she was .made a ward of the court
she was just under 18 years of age and the adjudication was
based on a finding that she had taken an automobile in violation of Vehicle Code, section 10851 and llad committed grand
theft in violation of Penal Code, section 487, subdivision 1.
The allef{ed burglary was from a parked automobile and took
place after the verdict finding petitioner guilty was returned.
The charge was later reduced to petty theft.
In the absence of specih.l circumstances such as were present in PeopZe v. Murphy, 59 Ca1.2d 818, 831-832 [31 Cal.
Rptr. 306, 382 P.2d 346J, evidence of the juvenile court ad:iudication and the facts on which it was based was not

j
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admissible to impeach the prosecuting witness. (PeopZev.
Hoffman, 199 Cal. 155, 159 [248 P. 504] ; PeopZe v. Han\iZton,
60 Cal.2d 105, 116-117 (32 Ca1.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412] ; PeopZe v. Gomez, 152 Cal.App.2d 139, 142-143 [313 P.2d 58];
Welt. & 1nst. Code, § 503; Code Civ. Proc., § 2051.) Moreover, defense counsel obviously could not introduce evidencc
of a burglary that had not yet occurred. He made the best
nsehe could of the prosecuting witness's record by pointing
out to the trial court that her record was before the court in
the probation report and urging that in the light of t11at
record, the court should resolve the con1licts in the evidence
in petitioner's favor and grant the motion for a new trial.
[3] Petitioner contends that he was denied effective representation of counsel on appeal when the counsel appointed
to represent him informed the court that he could find no
meritorious grounds of appeal and refused to file a brief or·
argue the case orally. He contends that the appellate court
should have appointed another counsel to represent him or,
at least, formally relieved counsel of his assignment and
offered petitioner the opportunity personally to present oral
as well as written argument.
In Douglas v. State of California, 372 U.S. 353 [83 S.Ct.
814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811], the United States Supreme Court held
t]lat it was a denial of equal protection of the laws to refuse
to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant on his
appeal from a criminal conviction. (See also Vasquez v. District CoUrt of AppeaZ, 59 Ca1.2d 585, 586-587 [30 Ca1.Rptr.
467, 381 P.2d 203].) We believe that the requirement of the
Douglas case is met, however, when, as in this ease, counsel is
appointed to represent the defendant on appeal, thorougllly
studies the record, consults with the defendant and trial
counsel, and conscientiously concludes that there are no meritorious grounds of appeal. If thereafter the appeUate court is
satisfied from its own review of the record in the light of allY
points raised by the defendant personally t11at counsel's assessment of the record is correct, it need not appoint another
counsel· to represent the defendant on appeal and may properly decide the appeal without oral argument. (See Federal
Commu'1licati.ons Com. v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 276, 283-284 [69
S.Ct. 1097, 93 IJ:Ed. 1353,1360, 1364-1365] ; Dyke Water Co.
v. Public Utilities Com., 56 Ca1.2d 105, 125 [14 Cal.Rptr. 310,
363 P.2d 326].)
This procedure, which was adopted by the District Court of
Appeal in this case, afforded petitioner substantially the
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same representation by counsel on appeal as is afforded indigent federal prisoners seeking to appeal in forma pauperis.
(See Coppedge v.United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 [82 S.Ot;
917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21, 28-29J i Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S.
674, 675 [78 S.Ot. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060, 1061]; Johnson v.
United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 [77 8.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593,
594] ; United States v. Pravato, 282 F.2d 587, 591; Porter v.
United States, 272 F.2d695 i see also State ex reI. White v.
Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 578-579 [34 N.E.2d 129] i People v.
Brown, 55 Ca1.2d 64, 73-74 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072],
concurring opinion i People v. Linden, 204 Cal.App.2d 745
[22 Ca1.Rptr. 633].) Admittedly, it does not insure exact
equality between indigent. defendants and those who have
ample funds to retain counsel, for undoubtedly a defendant
with sufficient funds could ultimately find counsel to brief
and argue even the most frivolous appeal. Exact equality,
however, is impossible to attain (see McGarty v. O'Brien,
188 F.2d 151, 155, 157 i United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540,
547, affd. 344 U.S. 561, 568 [73 S.Ct. 391, 97 L.Ed. 549,
556] ), and the United States Supreme Court recognized in
the Douglas case that it is not required; that only "invidious
discrimination" denies equal protection. (Douglas v. State
of California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-357 [83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d
811, 814] ; see also Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423-424
[83 8. Ct. 1366, 10 L.Ed.2d 456, 459].) Competent counsel
was appointed to represent petitioner on appeal. He was not
subject to invidious discrimination because neither that counsel nor the District Court of Appeal could discover a meritorious ground of appeal and the court therefore refused to
appoint another counsel to represent him.
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition is
denied.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.

